Affective coherence: Affect as embodied evidence in attitude, advertising and art

For the first time, this volume brings together these varied developments under one umbrella and furnishes a comprehensive overview of this intellectual ..

Affective state influences retrieval-induced forgetting for integrated knowledge

Selectively testing parts of learned materials can impair later memory for nontested materials. Research has shown that such retrieval-induced forgetting occurs for low-integrated materials but may be prevented for high-integrated materials. However, previous research has neglected one factor that is ubiquitous in real-life testing: affective stat

Rapidly Measuring the Speed of Unconscious Learning: Amnesics Learn Quickly and Happy People Slowly

BACKGROUND We introduce a method for quickly determining the rate of implicit learning. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS The task involves making a binary prediction for a probabilistic sequence over 10 minutes; from this it is possible to determine the influence of events of a different number of trials in the past on the current decision. This profile directly reflects the learning rate parameter of a large class of learning algorithms including the delta and Rescorla-Wagner rules. To illustrate the use of the method, we compare a person with amnesia with normal controls and we compare people with induced happy and sad moods. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Learning on the task is likely both associative and implicit. We argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that both amnesia and also transient negative moods can be associated with an especially large learning rate: People with amnesia can learn quickly and happy people slowl

On the reciprocal interaction between believing and feeling: an adaptive agent modelling perspective

An agent’s beliefs usually depend on informational or cognitive factors such as observation or received communication or reasoning, but also affective factors may play a role. In this paper, by adopting neurological theories on the role of emotions and feelings, an agent model is introduced incorporating the interaction between cognitive and affective factors in believing. The model describes how the strength of a belief may not only depend on information obtained, but also on the emotional responses on the belief. For feeling emotions a recursive body loop between preparations for emotional responses and feelings is assumed. The model introduces a second feedback loop for the interaction between feeling and belief. The strength of a belief and of the feeling both result from the converging dynamic pattern modelled by the combination of the two loops. For some specific cases it is described, for example, how for certain personal characteristics an optimistic world view is generated in the agent’s beliefs, or, for other characteristics, a pessimistic world view. Moreover, the paper shows how such affective effects on beliefs can emerge and become stronger over time due to experiences obtained. It is shown how based on Hebbian learning a connection from feeling to belief can develop. As these connections affect the strenghts of future beliefs, in this way an effect of judgment ‘by experience built up in the past’ or ‘by gut feeling’ can be obtained. Some example simulation results and a mathematical analysis of the equilibria are presented

Imagination and Film

This chapter addresses the application of contemporary theories of the imagination—largely drawn from cognitive psychology—to our understanding of film. Topics include the role of the imagination in our learning what facts hold within a fictional film, including what characters’ motivations, beliefs, and feelings are; how our perceptual experience of a film explains our imaginative visualizing of its contents; how fictional scenarios in films generate certain affective and evaluative responses; and how such responses compare to those we have toward analogous circumstances in real life

Joy leads to overconfidence, and a simple countermeasure

Overconfidence has been identified as a source of suboptimal decision making in many real-life domains, with often far-reaching consequences. This study identifies a mechanism that can cause overconfidence and demonstrates a simple, effective countermeasure in an incentive-compatible experimental study. We observed that joy induced overconfidence if the reason for joy (an unexpected gift) was u

Mood and cognition in healthy older European adults: the Zenith study

YesBackground: The study aim was to determine if state and trait intra-individual measures of everyday affect predict cognitive functioning in healthy older community dwelling European adults (n = 387), aged 55-87 years. Methods: Participants were recruited from centres in France, Italy and Northern Ireland. Trait level and variability in positive and negative affect (PA and NA) were assessed using self-administered PANAS scales, four times a day for four days. State mood was assessed by one PANAS scale prior to assessment of recognition memory, spatial working memory, reaction time and sustained attention using the CANTAB computerized test battery. Results: A series of hierarchical regression analyses were carried out, one for each measure of cognitive function as the dependent variable, and socio-demographic variables (age, sex and social class), state and trait mood measures as the predictors. State PA and NA were both predictive of spatial working memory prior to looking at the contribution of trait mood. Trait PA and its variability were predictive of sustained attention. In the final step of the regression analyses, trait PA variability predicted greater sustained attention, whereas state NA predicted fewer spatial working memory errors, accounting for a very small percentage of the variance (1-2%) in the respective tests. Conclusion: Moods, by and large, have a small transient effect on cognition in this older sample

Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based decision making for health policy makers

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Current healthcare systems have extended the evidence-based medicine (EBM) approach to health policy and delivery decisions, such as access-to-care, healthcare funding and health program continuance, through attempts to integrate valid and reliable evidence into the decision making process. These policy decisions have major impacts on society and have high personal and financial costs associated with those decisions. Decision models such as these function under a shared assumption of rational choice and utility maximization in the decision-making process.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>We contend that health policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-based policy making (EBPM) because humans make decisions with their naturally limited, faulty, and biased decision-making processes. A cognitive information processing framework is presented to support this argument, and subtle cognitive processing mechanisms are introduced to support the focal thesis: health policy makers' decisions are influenced by the subjective manner in which they individually process decision-relevant information rather than on the objective merits of the evidence alone. As such, subsequent health policy decisions do not necessarily achieve the goals of evidence-based policy making, such as maximizing health outcomes for society based on valid and reliable research evidence.</p> <p>Summary</p> <p>In this era of increasing adoption of evidence-based healthcare models, the rational choice, utility maximizing assumptions in EBDM and EBPM, must be critically evaluated to ensure effective and high-quality health policy decisions. The cognitive information processing framework presented here will aid health policy decision makers by identifying how their decisions might be subtly influenced by non-rational factors. In this paper, we identify some of the biases and potential intervention points and provide some initial suggestions about how the EBDM/EBPM process can be improved.</p